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Tornadoes are nature’s most powerful and destructive storms, ca-
pable of producing winds in excess of 300 miles per hour, yet they 
are notoriously capricious, leveling one home and leaving the next un-
damaged. The United States experiences more than 1,200 tornadoes per 
year, and since 1900 over 15,000 lives have been lost in tornadoes. The 
deadliest tornado in U.S. history, the 1925 Tri-State Tornado, tracked 
across three states and killed 695 persons, devastating entire towns. 
Tornadoes have occupied a place in the national consciousness at least 
since the 1939 movie The Wizard of Oz, when a Kansas twister blew 
Dorothy and Toto to Oz. Every spring thousands of people spend weeks 
trekking across the Plains chasing tornadoes.
How can economists or social scientists contribute to our knowl-
edge of tornadoes? While cloud dynamics and the technical properties 
of weather radars are outside these fi elds, economics can help us un-
derstand the impact of tornadoes on society. Economics can provide 
relevant evidence on several issues related to societal impacts:
• Have tornadoes become less deadly over time?
• If so, how much have the efforts of the National Weather Service 
(NWS) contributed to this?
• What measures offer the greatest potential to reduce casualties in a 
cost-effective manner?
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An understanding of the causes is necessary to reduce the impacts 
of severe weather. Just as physicians must understand the causes of ill-
ness to successfully treat patients, meteorologists require information 
about societal impacts. Attempts to reduce casualties not founded on 
solid analysis could prove unsuccessful or incur excessive costs.
Tornadoes also provide evidence on some questions of signifi cance 
to policymakers:
• People sometimes have diffi culty making sense of small risks of 
death and either overestimate or underestimate these risks (Camerer
and Kunreuther 1989; McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993). Is 
misperception of risk a problem with tornadoes?
• Can an economic model of information help us understand peoples’ 
reactions to hazard warnings?
• How prevalent is underpreparation for natural hazards? Hurricane 
Katrina has raised the issue of poor societal preparation for hazards 
to high salience for policy (Meyer 2006).
Because of the broad reach of tornadoes (they have occurred in all 
states), their impacts depend on the preparations and actions of essen-
tially all Americans, a fact that underscores the importance of evidence 
regarding these events.
This chapter analyzes the impact of tornadoes on the United States 
and is organized as follows. The next section reviews the aggregate 
impact of tornadoes on the nation, including three main components: 1) 
the cost of casualties, 2) the value of property damaged or destroyed, 
and 3) the cost of responding to tornado warnings. Overall the mone-
tized cost of tornadoes is $4.6 billion per year. We then discuss fi ndings 
on the determinants of tornado casualties, and we use these fi ndings to 
analyze how the impacts might be reduced. The fi nal section offers a 
brief conclusion.
THE SOCIETAL COST OF TORNADOES
Tornadoes threaten life and limb, and they damage and destroy 
property. Tornado warnings are also costly, because people must dis-
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rupt their daily activities to take shelter during a tornado warning. To 
provide perspective on the impact of tornadoes, we monetize the value 
of casualties, damages, and sheltering costs, based on U.S. averages for 
1996–2006. Damage is the easiest to monetize, and we use infl ation-
adjusted property damage as reported by the NWS, which averaged 
$1.07 billion annually (in 2007 dollars).1 Note that 1996–2006 included 
the tornado with the greatest reported damage in U.S. history, the May 
3, 1999, Oklahoma City F5 tornado.2
A total of 645 tornado fatalities occurred between 1996 and 2006, 
or 58.6 per year. Comparing fatalities with damage requires applica-
tion of a dollar fi gure for the lives lost. The value of a statistical life 
as revealed in market trade-offs constitutes a reasonable way to value 
lives for such public policy purposes.3 We use the value of a statistical 
life applied by the Environmental Protection Agency in a benefi t-cost 
analysis of the Clean Air Act (EPA 1997). The EPA used a fi gure of 
$4.8 million in 1990 dollars, based on a meta-analysis of dozens of 
published studies. Adjusting this value for infl ation yields a value of 
$7.6 million in 2007 dollars. The monetized value of tornado fatalities 
is thus $445 million per year.
Tornadoes injured an average of 999 persons annually. Values of 
statistical injuries have been developed using market data, and the EPA 
(1997) has applied monetary values for a variety of injuries. A diffi culty 
arises in applying existing values to tornado injuries due to a dearth 
of information on the distribution of the severity of tornado injuries. 
Epidemiological studies in the aftermath of selected tornadoes provide 
some evidence on the severity of injuries, which overall are not very se-
vere. Brown et al. (2002), for example, found that 76 percent of injuries 
in the May 3, 1999, Oklahoma tornado outbreak did not require hos-
pitalization and that the average hospital stay was seven days. Carter, 
Millson, and Allen (1989) found that 83 percent of injuries in the May 
31, 1985, Ontario, Canada, tornado outbreak were minor, with an aver-
age hospital stay of 12.5 days. Given this evidence, we follow Merrell, 
Simmons, and Sutter (2005) and use a value of a statistical injury equal 
to 1 percent of the value of a statistical life, or $76,000. The monetary 
value of injuries is then $76 million per year.
We turn next to the cost of tornado warnings, that is, the value of 
time spent under warnings. Although taking cover during a tornado 
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warning can save lives, the disruption of business or leisure activities 
is costly. Between 1996 and 2004, the NWS issued around 3,500 warn-
ings per year, which were in effect for an average of 41 minutes each.4 
We use the U.S. Census estimated population of the warned county 
and the duration of each warning to estimate person-hours spent under 
warnings. The average warned county had a population of 98,000, so 
an average of 234 million person-hours were spent under warnings an-
nually. For members of the workforce, the hourly wage measures the 
opportunity cost of time. We use the average civilian nonfarm hourly 
wage of $17.42 in 2007 (BLS 2007) to value employed persons’ time 
lost, and we value the time of individuals who are not employed, 52 
percent of the population, at half this amount. The weighted average 
value of time is $12.89, and the annual value of time spent under warn-
ings is $3.02 billion.
Table 6.1 summarizes the impacts of tornadoes quantifi ed here. The 
cost is $4.6 billion per year, and the value of time spent under warnings 
accounts for nearly two-thirds of this total, property damage 23 per-
cent, fatalities at just under 10 percent, and injuries less than 2 percent. 
Note that this total does not include societal impacts, such as business 
interruption, alternative living expenses, and external, community-wide 
impacts. Although tornado impacts on a metropolitan area are modest, 
major tornadoes can signifi cantly impact small communities. In April 
2007, a tornado heavily damaged the business district of Tulia, Texas 
(population 4,700). The town’s only grocery store never reopened after 
the tornado, leaving residents with a 60-mile round trip drive to Ama-
rillo for grocery shopping (Martinez and Ewing 2008).
Readers might fi nd the large contribution of time under warnings 
to the total impact of tornadoes surprising. One way to put the costs of 
warnings in perspective is to consider how the cost of tornadoes would 
have differed in the 1920s. Brooks and Doswell (2002) estimate that 
the U.S. tornado fatality rate fell from 1.8 per million residents then to 
0.11 per million in 2000. If the higher 1920s rate occurred today, the 
nation would experience an average of 960 fatalities per year, not the 
59 actually observed since 1996. Applying the $7.6 million value of 
a statistical life yields a cost of fatalities of $7.3 billion annually; the 
NWS did not issue warnings in the 1920s, so there is no basis for com-
paring cost of time spent under warnings. The lethality of tornadoes has 
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been so greatly reduced that responding to warnings now represents the 
largest part of the cost of tornadoes. The total cost is substantially lower 
today because tornadoes are less deadly.
WHAT ARE THE DETERMINANTS OF
TORNADO CASUALTIES?
An analysis of tornado casualties reveals several signifi cant patterns 
discussed in this section. The fi gures cited are from a regression analy-
sis of tornado fatalities and injuries from 1986 to 2004. The data set has 
been constructed by the authors using the Storm Prediction Center’s 
(SPC) national tornado archive, the NWS’s tornado warning verifi ca-
tion records, and U.S. Census data.5 The unit of observation is the state 
tornado segment, because the SPC archive reports separate entries for 
multistate tornadoes. For simplicity we will usually just say tornadoes 
and not state tornado segments in the text. Appendix 6A discusses the 
details of the regression model and precise variable defi nitions, and 
Table 6A.1 reports the full results.




% of monetized 
impact
Property damage — 1,070 23.2
Fatalities 58.6 445 9.7







NOTE: Damage and casualties are averages for 1996–2006, time under warnings an 
average for 1996–2004. The valuation of lives lost, injuries, and time under warnings 
is discussed in the text.
SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) tornado 
fatality location data, available from the NOAA by permission.
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Most Tornadoes Are Not Killers
Only 347 of the almost 21,000 tornadoes in our data set resulted in 
one or more fatalities, and 1,988 resulted in one or more injuries. That 
is, 98 percent of tornadoes had no fatalities, and 91 percent caused no 
injuries. The risk to life and limb posed by tornadoes is quite concen-
trated in powerful storms. The most powerful tornadoes are rated F4 or 
F5 on the Fujita scale of tornado damage.6 Nine of the ten F5 tornadoes 
and 42 percent of F4 tornadoes between 1986 and 2004 killed at least 
one person, and these tornadoes accounted for 43 percent of fatalities. 
The 41 tornadoes that resulted in fi ve or more fatalities (less than 0.2 
percent of the total) accounted for half of all fatalities.
Tornadoes rated F3 or stronger are much more likely to result in fa-
talities or injuries. Table 6.2, constructed from the regression analysis, 
reports fatalities and injuries by tornadoes of different F-scale ratings 
relative to an F0 tornado. Expected fatalities are about 27,000 times 
more likely with an F5 tornado than with an F0, and injuries are almost 
2,000 times more likely in F5 tornadoes. Both fatalities and injuries 
increase fairly consistently with each F-scale category increase.
Location, Location, Location
Many observers have noted the vulnerability of mobile homes to tor-
nadoes (American Meteorological Society 1997; Brooks and Doswell 
2002; Golden and Adams 2000; Golden and Snow 1991). Figure 6.1 re-
ports tornado fatalities by location as tracked by the NWS for the years 
Table 6.2  Tornado Casualties by Fujita Scale Rating






NOTE: The values in the table are the ratio of expected fatalities or injuries in a tornado 
of each F-scale category rating relative to an otherwise equivalent F0 tornado.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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1985–2007.7 More fatalities occurred in mobile homes (43 percent) 
than any other location. Permanent homes, which include single-family 
homes and apartments, rank second at 31 percent, followed by vehicles 
at 9 percent, schools and churches, businesses, and outdoor or other 
locations at about 5 percent each. The proportion of fatalities in manu-
factured homes is disproportionately high. These structures constituted 
only 7.6 percent of U.S. housing units in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 
2000), but the fatality rate for manufactured homes is at least ten times 
that of permanent homes. Regression analysis confi rms the dependence 
of casualties on the housing stock. An increase of one standard devia-
tion in mobile homes as a proportion of county housing units increases 
expected fatalities by 36 percent and expected injuries by 26 percent.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from NOAA tornado fatality location data.
Figure 6.1  Tornado Fatalities by Location (%)
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Timing Matters
Timing signifi cantly affects casualties, including time of day, day 
of the week, and month of the year. Tornadoes during the evening and 
overnight hours are signifi cantly more likely to kill or injure people. 
Figure 6.2 reports an index for casualties by time of day based on 
the regression analysis. We divide the day into fi ve time periods, the 
overnight hours (midnight to 6 a.m.), morning (6 a.m. to noon), early 
afternoon (noon to 4 p.m.), late afternoon (4 p.m. to 8 p.m.), and late 
evening (8 p.m. to midnight). The index sets fatalities and injuries from 
an early afternoon tornado equal to 100, and represents casualties from 
tornadoes at other times relative to an early afternoon tornado. Fatalities 
for overnight tornadoes exceed those of early afternoon tornadoes by a 
factor of nearly 2.5 and those for late evening tornadoes by a factor of 
Figure 6.2  Time of Day and Tornado Casualties
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NWS Storm Prediction Center’s tornado ar-
chive.
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more than 2. A similar pattern is observed for injuries, but the amplitude 
of the time of day effects are not as great; injuries are 43 percent and 32 
percent higher overnight and in the late evening, respectively, than for 
a comparable early afternoon tornado.
Tornado casualties also vary widely by month. Figure 6.3 presents 
an index of fatalities and injuries by month derived from the regres-
sion analysis. The index equals 100 for both fatalities and injuries in 
February, the month with the deadliest tornadoes. The difference in 
lethality across months is quite substantial, as a tornado in February 
yields more than 14 times the fatalities of an otherwise equal tornado 
in July. Tornadoes are less deadly in the spring and summer months 
(with the exception of August) than tornadoes in the late fall or winter. 
Injuries exhibit the same basic pattern, except that again the variation 
is substantially less than for fatalities (injuries in January tornadoes ex-
ceed those in May tornadoes by a factor of 2.5). The low casualty rates 
Figure 6.3  Tornado Casualties by Month
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NWS Storm Prediction Center’s tornado ar-
chive.
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in May, June, and July benefi t the nation, since these months have the 
largest numbers of tornadoes, while the high lethality in November, 
December, January, and February applies to relatively few tornadoes. 
Although a difference in intensity of storms not fully captured by the 
F-scale variables may be thought to drive the result, the strongest torna-
does occur in the spring months. Hours of darkness might explain some 
of the variation over months, because tornadoes that occur after dark 
are more dangerous (see Ashley, Knmenec, and Schwantes 2008, who 
control for the exact time of sunset). But variation in casualties across 
months is much greater than the variation across the day, so darkness 
probably cannot explain much of the variation over the year. Surprise 
might drive this result; residents may not expect tornadoes during the 
winter, and thus are not alert for and ready to respond to a warning. 
In contrast, during the spring residents might suspect that an ominous 
thunderstorm could produce a tornado. Surprise would need to affect 
warning responses, since the regressions control for tornado warnings.
The day of the week also affects fatalities. Intuition suggests that 
casualties might be higher on either weekends or weekdays. On week-
ends people might be busy with recreation and leisure activities and 
not closely following the weather and weather warnings, while week-
day tornadoes could occur during evening rush hour traffi c jams. The 
regression analysis fi nds that weekend tornadoes are more dangerous: 
expected fatalities and injuries are 40 percent and 8 percent higher, 
respectively, than for tornadoes during the week, although only the fa-
talities result attains statistical signifi cance.
The Efforts of the National Weather Service
Protecting persons is part of the mission of the NWS, and tornado 
warnings have been issued since the 1950s to try to reduce casualties 
(Doswell, Moller, and Brooks 1999). The NWS installed WSR-88D 
(Doppler) radars at Weather Forecast Offi ces (WFOs) across the coun-
try between 1992 and 1997. The radars, adapted from military use, 
allow much better resolution of wind fi elds in severe storms. Viewers of 
weather coverage on television are probably familiar with the Doppler 
radar image of the “hook echo” of a tornado. Simmons and Sutter (2005) 
analyzed the effect of Doppler radar on tornado warnings and casualties 
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by using the radar installation date for each WFO to determine which 
tornadoes occurred after installation of the new radars. Over the period 
from 1986 to 1999, Doppler radar increased the percentage of storms 
warned for from 35 to 60 percent and the mean lead time from 5.3 to 9.5 
minutes; it also reduced the percentage of false alarm warnings from 
79 to 76 percent. The new radars also reduced expected fatalities by 45 
percent and expected injuries by 40 percent. We update the casualties 
analysis with these regressions, including more years of tornadoes and 
more county-level control variables.
We also investigate the role of tornado warnings on casualties. Spe-
cifi cally, we focus on whether a longer lead time reduces casualties, or 
whether instead there is an optimal lead time for a warning. Although 
responding to a tornado warning does not take long, for example, in 
contrast with evacuation for a hurricane, issuing the warning is just 
one part of the warning process. The warning must be disseminated to 
residents in harm’s way via television, radio, tornado sirens, the Inter-
net, or other channels, including phone calls from friends or relatives. 
Dissemination takes time, creating a need for longer lead times. We 
can determine from NWS tornado warning verifi cation records whether 
each tornado was warned for or not. We have explored several ways to 
model warnings, including an indicator variable for whether a warning 
was issued for the tornado and the lead time on the warning in minutes 
(Simmons and Sutter 2008a). Here we focus on a set of dummy vari-
ables for lead times in the ranges of 1 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 20, 21 
to 30, and 31 or more minutes. The lead time is specifi cally the number 
of minutes between the time the warning was issued and the beginning 
of the tornado.8 Creating intervals allows the marginal effect of lead 
time to vary in a possibly irregular manner.
Figure 6.4 presents the effect of lead time on fatalities and injuries. 
We again use an index to display the effect, with the index set equal 
to 100 for tornadoes with no warning or a warning lead time of zero 
minutes. An index value less than 100 indicates that lead time reduces 
casualties. Tornado warnings reduce injuries at all lead time intervals, 
with the largest reductions occurring in the 11 to 15 and 31+ minute 
intervals—42 percent and 44 percent, respectively. The reductions in 
injuries in the other lead time intervals range from 23 to 33 percent, and 
although the lead time variables are statistically signifi cant, the differ-
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ences between the intervals are not generally statistically signifi cant. 
Thus warnings reduce injuries, but the marginal effect of lead time is 
essentially zero after 15 minutes.
The situation is different for fatalities. Lead times up to 15 minutes 
reduce fatalities by 19 percent, 51 percent, and 31 percent in the 1 to 
5, 6 to 10, and 11 to 15 minute intervals, respectively. But lead times 
greater than 15 minutes increase fatalities relative to no warning, and by 
a sizable (and statistically signifi cant) amount: 57 percent, 49 percent, 
and 11 percent for the 16 to 20, 21 to 30, and 31+ minute intervals, 
respectively. Some of these fatalities may occur because residents re-
act to long lead times by taking actions that increase their risk relative 
to those taken when there is no warning. In addition, long lead times 
sometimes result when a warning is issued but not canceled and a tor-
Figure 6.4  Warning Lead Time and Casualties
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NWS Storm Prediction Center’s tornado ar-
chive.
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nado eventually occurs in the warning area; residents may not consider 
that such warnings convey the same degree of risk as those issued for an 
imminent tornado. As Simmons and Sutter (2008a) discuss, the increase 
in fatalities for long lead times refl ects a handful of well-warned-of and 
particularly deadly tornadoes. A contributing factor is that powerful tor-
nadoes tend to occur during large tornado outbreaks, and consequently 
are well warned of. We do not observe how many fatalities might result 
if the most powerful tornadoes occurred without warning. Furthermore, 
the warnings for some of these killer tornadoes may not have been 
disseminated to residents. For example, consider the 1987 Saragosa, 
Texas, tornado, which had a lead time of 22 minutes and resulted in 30 
deaths. As Aguirre (1988) discusses, the fatalities occurred in an immi-
grant community where residents watched Spanish-language television 
networks that did not broadcast the warning, and thus they were effec-
tively unwarned about the tornado.
While tornado warnings alert residents to danger, most warnings, 
because they are issued in advance of the tornado, turn out to be false 
alarms. The national false alarm ratio (FAR) was 0.744 in 2004, mean-
ing that tornadoes did not occur in the warned county in three out of 
four cases. When warnings do not come to pass, the cry-wolf effect 
might apply: that is, residents might dismiss future warnings as false 
alarms, reducing the effectiveness of warnings that do precede torna-
does. A higher FAR reduces the value of the information contained in 
warnings, and should at some point reduce warning response. Yet a 
false alarm effect has been diffi cult to uncover: Barnes et al. (2007) fi nd 
that “evidence for the cry-wolf effect in natural hazards research . . . has 
not been forthcoming” (p. 1142).
The extensive NWS tornado warning verifi cation records allow 
a careful test of the effect of false alarms on tornado casualties, and 
by implication warning response. A complication arises because false 
alarms are nonevents, while tornadoes are events. It is not clear which 
tornado warnings, as regards both false alarms and verifi ed warnings, 
should apply to constructing an FAR for different tornado events. If 
all warnings nationwide apply to all tornadoes, there will be no cross-
sectional variation in FARs, and we would be forced to try to disentan-
gle the effect of changes in the national FAR from a time trend. Warning 
performance, however, varies substantially across the nation as well as 
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over time, and thus we use local, recent warnings to calculate an FAR 
in our analysis. Specifi cally, we use warnings issued in the state struck 
by a tornado over the previous 12 months to calculate an FAR that we 
use as a control variable in our regression analysis.9
We fi nd strong evidence of a false alarm effect, consistent with 
economic models of the value of information. A higher state FAR signifi -
cantly increases both fatalities and injuries. An increase of one standard 
deviation in the FAR (which is 0.117) increases expected fatalities by 
10 percent and injuries by 9 percent. The national FAR declined after 
the NWS installed Doppler weather radars, so some of the reduction in 
casualties attributed above to Doppler radar (perhaps 10–20 percent of 
the 30–45 percent reduction) appears to have resulted from decreased 
false alarms. We have also calculated recent, local FARs using NWS 
Weather Forecast Offi ce County Warning Areas and TV markets as de-
fi ned by the A. C. Nielsen Company over one- and two-year intervals 
for robustness. We fi nd a similar false alarm effect using these alterna-
tive FAR defi nitions (Simmons and Sutter 2009).
The dependence of casualties on time of day may constitute indirect 
evidence of the effectiveness of tornado warnings. Tornado warnings 
help reduce casualties only if people respond to them, and residents are 
probably less likely to receive warnings issued at night when they are 
asleep. Thus some portion of the lower fatalities and injuries for day-
time tornadoes may be due to the lifesaving effects of tornado warnings.
The Demographics of Tornado Vulnerability
Economists have found that safety is generally a normal or luxury 
good: as people become wealthier and secure the necessities of life, 
they look to reduce risks of premature death. For natural hazards, 
Hurricane Katrina highlighted the converse of this proposition, the vul-
nerability of low-income households. Recent research has documented 
a negative relationship between income and natural hazards fatalities 
across countries (Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2005; Kahn 2005). 
Higher-income households could reduce tornado risk in several ways: 
by purchasing higher-quality homes (or not residing in manufactured 
homes), installing in-home tornado shelters, and purchasing NOAA 
weather radios or other emergency alert systems. Wealthier communi-
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ties might be more likely to invest in tornado sirens and emergency 
management and emergency medical services.
Yet county-level income does not appear to reduce tornado fa-
talities or injuries. Our previous research (Simmons and Sutter 2005, 
2008a) has shown that tornado paths through areas with higher median 
incomes have signifi cantly greater fatalities and injuries, contrary to 
expectations. We include extra control variables in the regressions re-
ported here, and the statistical signifi cance of income is diminished, 
although an increase of one standard deviation in median income still 
increases expected fatalities and injuries by 8 to 9 percent. The income 
effect we found previously may be due to urbanization. Our previous 
and current regressions include population density, which as we would 
expect increases casualties since the number of persons in the path 
of a tornado affects the likelihood of casualties. Our regressions here 
also include the rural proportion of county population, as characterized 
by the Census Bureau; a larger rural population signifi cantly reduces 
both fatalities and injuries. Urban areas have higher incomes than rural 
areas, and so the positive effect of income on casualties may be a re-
sidual consequence of a population effect.
Tornadoes seem to run counter to several other common elements 
of natural hazards vulnerability. The elderly are considered an at-risk 
population, and this vulnerability might be particularly acute for torna-
does, as the elderly may have diffi culty hearing sirens or an approaching 
tornado and quickly moving to shelter without assistance. Yet a larger 
proportion of county residents over age 65 are associated with signifi -
cantly reduced fatalities and injuries. Injuries also decrease with larger 
portions of residents under 18 and male residents. Poverty is normally 
associated with greater vulnerability, and here we have mixed evidence: 
an increased county poverty rate increases (although not signifi cantly) 
expected fatalities and reduces expected injuries. But poverty likely af-
fects the propensity of a household to live in manufactured housing, 
and this defi nitely increases vulnerability. Education is also related to 
vulnerability. A low level of education as indicated by the proportion of 
residents over age 25 who did not graduate from high school increases 
both fatalities and injuries. But the proportion of persons with a four-
year college degree does not affect casualties. Long commuting times 
might also affect vulnerability to tornadoes, particularly since many tor-
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nadoes occur during the evening rush hour. We fi nd some evidence of 
the vulnerability of commuters, as a higher proportion of residents with 
a commute over 30 minutes signifi cantly increases fatalities but does 
not affect injuries.
HOW MIGHT TORNADO IMPACTS BE REDUCED?
Our analysis of tornado impacts can assist in evaluating alterna-
tives for reducing impacts. Economics provides numerous examples of 
policies that fail to achieve their goal or even have unintended negative 
consequences. Several options exist for trying to reduce tornado im-
pacts, and our analysis can help evaluate the comparative advantages 
and possible interactions between these alternatives. Based on our anal-
ysis we offer four insights on reducing tornado impacts. Note that the 
potential gain in reduced casualties from one measure falls when other 
measures are simultaneously employed. For example, the United States 
currently experiences about 60 tornado fatalities per year. A measure 
that reduces fatalities by 25 percent would currently save about 15 lives 
per year. If another measure fi rst reduces fatalities to 40 per year, the 25 
percent reduction in fatalities now saves 10 lives per year, and so the 
benefi ts of the measure fall by one-third. Thus our statements about po-
tential casualty reductions are all based on recent casualties and assume 
no other measures are employed.
Tornado Warnings
As previously discussed, the value of time spent under warnings 
represents a signifi cant portion of the societal cost of tornadoes. A re-
cent NWS innovation will signifi cantly reduce the amount of time spent 
under warnings. The NWS introduced Storm Based Warnings (SBWs) 
for tornadoes (and other types of severe weather) nationwide in October 
2007. SBWs warn for a polygon area near the tornado circulation, not 
an entire county. In tests the new warnings reduced the area warned by 
70 to 75 percent compared with county warnings, with no compromise 
of safety since residents actually at risk from the possible tornado are 
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still warned (Looney 2006; Jacks and Ferree 2007). The new warnings 
will signifi cantly benefi t society, although the savings of time sheltering 
depends on how many people actually responded to county warnings. 
Assuming a 50 percent response rate to county warnings and a 70 per-
cent reduction in warned area, SBWs will reduce the value of time spent 
sheltering by $1 billion per year (Sutter and Erickson, forthcoming). 
SBWs could help reduce tornado casualties as well, since more precise 
and hence valuable information in the new warnings should improve 
response. Counties are large relative to tornado damage paths: the area 
of the typical county struck by tornadoes is about 1,000 square miles, 
compared to a mean tornado damage area of 0.3 square miles.10 Thus 
the old county warnings provided relatively little detail on the loca-
tion of a possible tornado. By conveying a higher level of risk for the 
warned area, SBWs might make residents more likely to abandon a 
manufactured home, as the NWS recommends, and increase the value 
of NOAA weather radios and commercial emergency alert systems. The 
technology exists to convey even more precise information on the lo-
cation of a tornado—for instance, through street-level storm tracking 
currently provided by some television stations.
Improved lead time for unwarned tornadoes can also reduce casual-
ties. An optimal warning lead time reduces fatalities and injuries by 50 
percent and 42 percent, respectively, relative to no warning. Between 
2000 and 2004, 46 percent of tornadoes occurred with a warning lead 
time of fi ve minutes or less. These tornadoes are underwarned for, in 
that our analysis shows that longer lead times should reduce casualties. 
Optimal warning for these tornadoes would reduce fatalities and injuries 
by an additional 21 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Given current 
warning technology, these tornadoes could not be warned for without 
increasing the FAR, and that would increase casualties. Improving lead 
time performance without increasing the FAR would require new tech-
nology or algorithms that shift the trade-off between detection and false 
alarms (see Brooks 2004 for a depiction of this trade-off).
On the other hand, we fi nd no evidence that increasing lead times 
beyond 15 minutes would benefi t society. In fact, longer lead times 
perversely result in more fatalities than a tornado without a warning. 
Although we think that this result may be anomalous, it does not follow 
that we would be likely to fi nd a further reduction in fatalities beyond 
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that observed in the 6 to 10 minute interval. And for injuries the marginal 
benefi t of lead time beyond the 11 to 15 minute interval is essentially 
zero. This diminishing return probably occurs because residents can re-
spond to a tornado warning—take cover in an interior room or storm 
shelter if available—quite quickly. Time is needed to disseminate a 
warning, but our results suggest that everyone who is likely to receive 
a warning has received it within 10 or 15 minutes. Thus our analysis of 
casualties leads us to expect that increased lead times beyond 15 min-
utes would not yield signifi cant benefi ts to society.
Tornado Shelters: Rarely Cost-Effective
Engineers have designed above-ground safe rooms and below-
ground shelters capable of protecting residents from even the strongest 
tornadoes. Below-ground shelters retail for $2,000 to $2,500, while safe 
rooms cost in excess of $5,000. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) included tornado shelters in its National Mitiga-
tion Strategy in the 1990s and issued performance criteria for shelters 
(FEMA 1999). FEMA and the state of Oklahoma collaborated on the 
Oklahoma Saferoom Initiative to provide rebates to homeowners in-
stalling a shelter or safe room.
The evidence suggests that tornado shelters are not a cost-effective 
way to reduce permanent home casualties. Merrell, Simmons, and Sut-
ter (2005) and Simmons and Sutter (2006) calculated the cost per life 
saved for shelters using historical casualties, predicted casualties from 
a regression model, and casualties per home struck by tornadoes. All 
three methods yield fairly consistent estimates for permanent homes; 
for instance, the cost per life saved in Oklahoma, at the heart of Tornado 
Alley, was over $50 million, which greatly exceeds market-revealed 
values of a statistical life (typically under $10 million). We illustrate the 
arithmetic with the historical fatality totals for Oklahoma, which expe-
rienced 263 tornado fatalities between 1950 and 2007, or 4.5 per year. 
In-home shelters can be expected to prevent only the 31 percent of fa-
talities that occur in permanent homes (see Figure 6.1). If all permanent 
home fatalities could be prevented, shelters would prevent 1.4 deaths 
per year.11 The cost of equipping all of the more than one million single-
family homes in the state with a shelter (at $2,000 per shelter) is over 
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$2 billion. The resulting cost per life saved in this calculation is $57 
million. As another way of understanding this result, 55 percent of per-
manent home fatalities occur in F4 and F5 tornadoes. Violent tornadoes 
occur too infrequently even in Tornado Alley to justify economically 
such an expenditure, regardless of the potentially fatal consequences. 
Hardening targets is an ineffective way to reduce permanent home 
fatalities.
Reducing Manufactured Home Vulnerability
Reducing the vulnerability of manufactured homes is crucial to re-
ducing tornado casualties. Although tornado shelters are unlikely to be 
cost-effective in permanent homes, the cost per life saved for mobile 
homes is less than $10 million in the most tornado-prone states. And the 
cost per life saved could be even lower with cost-sharing for shelters in 
manufactured home parks. Schmidlin, Hammer, and Knabe (2001) re-
port that manufactured home parks do in fact offer community shelters 
as an amenity for residents. Simmons and Sutter (2007) fi nd that lots 
in parks in Oklahoma with shelters rent at a 5 percent premium, which 
approximately covers the cost of a community shelter as estimated by 
FEMA (2000). Thus tornado shelters may help with the mobile home 
problem, but they are only part of the answer, and will be less effective 
for the majority of homes not located in a park.
Manufactured homes can also be made more wind-resistant. The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1994 amended the 
HUD code for manufactured housing to include wind load requirements 
in areas subject to high winds. Although intended to reduce hurricane-
related damage (to which end the rule has been effective; see Grosskopf 
2005), the wind load provisions appear to reduce tornado risk as well. 
Simmons and Sutter (2008b) examined the aftermath of the February 
2007 tornadoes in Lake County, Florida, which killed 21 persons, all in 
manufactured homes. A key factor in fatalities was whether the home 
was totally leveled, as characterized by county offi cials: 16 of the 17 
fatalities for which home condition could be ascertained occurred in 
leveled homes. Manufactured homes built to the wind load provisions 
were 79 percent less likely to be leveled than homes built before the 
HUD code went into effect. No fatalities could be documented in the 
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newer homes, and the reduction in the probability of a home being lev-
eled implies that in time fatalities could be reduced by as much as 70 
percent. Of course, whether these results extrapolate to other tornadoes 
(either stronger or weaker) is an open question, but improved construc-
tion may help mitigate the mobile home problem.
Tornadoes after Dark
Tornadoes are signifi cantly more dangerous at night than during the 
day. Casualties could be reduced if the lethality of nighttime tornadoes 
could be brought in line with tornadoes during the day. Between 1986 
and 2004, 177 and 116 fatalities and 2,871 and 2,217 injuries occurred 
in late evening (8 p.m.–midnight) and overnight (midnight–6 a.m.) tor-
nadoes, respectively. If these tornadoes were only as dangerous as early 
afternoon tornadoes, 155 fatalities and 1,308 injuries would have been 
avoided. Overall this would reduce fatalities by 16 percent and injuries 
by 7 percent.
A strategy to reduce this vulnerability depends on exactly why 
nighttime tornadoes are so lethal, which is an area of ongoing research. 
Three alternative explanations seem plausible. First, the warning pro-
cess might be less effective for nighttime tornadoes. That is, fewer 
people might receive these warnings because they happen to be asleep, 
as mentioned above. Second, and closely related, the response to night-
time warnings could differ. For instance, people might seek visual 
confi rmation of a tornado before reacting, and the diffi culty of seeing 
tornadoes at night might make people less likely to respond. Finally, the 
nighttime effect might be a consequence of the greater vulnerability of 
manufactured homes, since residents are more likely to be at home at 
night than during the day.12 If the vulnerability to tornadoes after dark is 
due to less effective warnings, emergency alert systems or more refi ned 
warnings might reduce this vulnerability. If nighttime fatalities are an 
extension of the mobile home problem, the HUD wind load provisions 
or tornado shelters in mobile home parks might address the problem.
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CONCLUSION
Our investigation has identifi ed several aspects of the distribution 
of tornado casualties and the relative likelihood of casualties. A handful 
of powerful (F3 or stronger) tornadoes, often clustered on super tornado 
outbreak days, account for a large fraction of total casualties. But the 
distribution of fatalities or injuries by F-scale does not tell us in which 
category society could most easily reduce casualties. We have found 
that tornadoes that strike mobile homes or after dark or on weekends or 
during the fall or winter months produce more casualties. If casualties 
in these circumstances could be reduced to the comparable rate in per-
manent homes for weekday tornadoes during the spring season, the toll 
from tornadoes would be reduced considerably. But overall casualties 
are not currently the largest component of the societal cost of tornadoes. 
Because tornadoes have become less deadly over the years, property 
damage and the cost of responding to warnings now account for the 
bulk of their societal impact. The introduction of Storm Based Warn-
ings by the NWS will reduce time spent under warnings by perhaps 70 
percent.
Our quantitative, large data set analysis also reveals some promis-
ing directions for qualitative, survey, or case study analysis. Large data 
set statistical analysis excels at identifying patterns in vulnerability but 
does not necessarily allow us to pinpoint the cause of the vulnerability. 
A relatively small number of tornadoes account for many of the fatali-
ties and injuries that drive our regression results; detailed case studies 
could help reveal whether special circumstances or details about the 
dissemination of warnings not readily captured by control variables 
contributed to the loss of life. Future qualitative research could help 
to address some of the casualty disparities. For instance, surveys could 
explore whether people respond differently to tornadoes at night or dur-
ing the fall and winter months. Additional quantitative and qualitative 
research will be needed to reduce the societal impacts of tornadoes in a 
cost-effective manner.
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Notes
We are grateful for continued fi nancial support from NOAA’s National Severe 
Storms Laboratory, the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, and the Natural Haz-
ards Center at the University of Colorado.
1. Information on property damage, and on injuries and fatalities resulting from tor-
nadoes in the following paragraphs, is from NOAA’s National Weather Service 
Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Historical Severe Storm Database, http://www.spc
.noaa.gov/wcm/index.html#data.
2. Brooks and Doswell (2001) present damage totals for past tornadoes adjusted for 
infl ation, population growth, and changes in national wealth. The May 3, 1999, F5 
tornado ranks eleventh in their adjusted damage calculations.
3. For a discussion of the concept of a statistical life and a survey of estimates from 
the market, see Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (2000).
4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tornado Warning 
Verifi cation Archive (StormDat), available from NOAA by permission.
5. The SPC archive can be accessed online at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/archive.
6. The Fujita scale rates tornado damage from F0 (weakest) to F5 (strongest). An F0 
is a minimal tornado that causes light damage; an F5 tornado causes “incredible” 
damage, including well-built homes swept off their foundations and cars thrown 
more than 100 meters. A description of the Fujita scale and the Enhanced Fujita 
scale can be found at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/f-scale.html.
7. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Tornado Fatality Lo-
cations, available from NOAA by permission.
8. By convention, the NWS counts a case where a tornado warning is issued after the 
tornado is on the ground as a warned tornado with a lead time of zero. We had pre-
viously separated out zero lead time tornadoes as an extra category, but the effect 
of a zero lead time warning was very close to (and statistically indistinguishable 
from) no warning.
9. These regressions omit tornadoes for which no warnings were issued in the state in 
the prior 12 months, since the FAR in these instances is undefi ned.
10. Authors’ calculation using NOAA’s National Weather Service Storm Prediction 
Center (SPC) Historical Severe Storm Database, http://www.spc.noaa.gov/wcm/
index.html#data.
11. And even then shelters would prevent all in-home fatalities only if residents al-
ways take shelter before the tornado hits.
12. Note that residual mobile home vulnerability could also explain the greater lethal-
ity of tornadoes on weekends.
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Appendix 6A
The impacts on tornado casualties discussed throughout this chapter are 
from a regression analysis of casualties. This appendix describes the details of 
the regression models. Fatalities and injuries take on nonnegative integer val-
ues; that is, the number of persons killed in a tornado can equal 0, 1, 2, or more, 
with a large number of zero observations. Ordinary least squares regression 
fails to take into account the truncation of casualties at zero, and thus instead 
a Poisson regression model is applied to this count data. The Poisson model 
(Greene 2000, pp. 880–886) assumes that the dependent variable yi is drawn 
from a Poisson distribution with parameter λi , or
Prob(Yi = yi) = e−λi × λiyi/yi!, yi = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The parameter λi of the distribution is assumed to be a log-linear function 
of the independent variables xi, or ln(λi) = β′ × xi. The Poisson regression model 
assumes equivalence of the conditional mean of yi and its variance; violation 
of this condition is known as overdispersion. The negative binomial regression 
model (Greene 2000, pp. 886–888), a generalization of the Poisson model, is 
recommended when the data exhibit overdispersion. Diagnostic tests consis-
tently indicate that injuries but not fatalities are overdispersed. Consequently 
we estimate fatalities with Poisson models and injuries with negative binomial 
models.
Our models include three categories of variables, describing character-
istics of the tornado, the tornado path, and NWS efforts to reduce casualties. 
The models also include, but we do not report, year dummy variables. The 
year variables control for nationwide changes over time, such as the advent 
of the Internet as a channel to communicate warnings, and any possible year-
to-year variation in warning response. The tornado characteristic variables are 
as described in the text, and model the rating of the tornado on the F-scale of 
tornado damage, the time of day, month, and whether the tornado occurred on 
a weekend. We also include the length of the damage path in miles.
The storm path variables control for the economic and demographic char-
acteristics of the area struck by the tornado. The variable labels in Table 6A.1 
are self-descriptive. The variables are constructed using census data for the 
counties reported as in the storm path. For a tornado that struck more than one 
county, the tornado path variables average the observations for each county in 
the storm path. The path variables for a specifi c year are based on linear in-
terpolation from the decennial censuses. For tornadoes after 2000, population 
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density is calculated using the census annual population estimates, while other 
variables use linear interpolation with county data from the 2006 American 
Community Survey when available. Mobile homes as a proportion of housing 
units by county was not reported in census publications prior to 1990, so for 
1986–1989 tornadoes, the values from the 1990 census are used. We also in-
clude an interaction term between path length and population density, because 
a long-track tornado through a highly populated area might affect casualties 
differently from an increase in either of these variables separately.
The NWS variables are a dummy variable for tornadoes that occurred af-
ter installation of Doppler radar and tornado warning. The Doppler variable 
equals 1 if the tornado occurred on or after the date on which Doppler radar 
was installed in the NWS Weather Forecast Offi ce with warning responsibility 
for the fi rst tornado in the storm’s path. Since warnings are issued by county, 
a tornado that strikes several counties may yield several valid warnings. We 
apply the warning for the fi rst county in the storm path. The tornado warning 
variables are dummy variables that indicate whether the lead time in minutes 
for the warning (if any) for the fi rst county in the storm path was in this inter-
val. The False Alarm Ratio (FAR) variable is the proportion of warnings issued 
in the state struck by the tornado in the prior 12 months that were false alarms 
(i.e., that did not verify, as defi ned by the NWS). Table 6A.1 reports one speci-
fi cation of the casualties regressions with the Doppler radar variable but no 
warning variables, and one specifi cation with the warning variables but not the 
Doppler variable. The Doppler radar specifi cations test for an impact of radar 
installation on casualties, which could be due to better warning for tornadoes 
or improved warning response.
Table 6A.1 reports the raw regression coeffi cients and standard errors. To 
interpret the coeffi cients as discussed in the text, the antilog of the coeffi cient 
must be taken. Thus to calculate the marginal effect of a dummy variable with 
coeffi cient βk from the table, the percentage change in expected casualties is 
100 × (exp[βk] − 1). The percentage change in expected casualties due to a one 
standard deviation increase in variable k, σk , in variable k is 100 × (exp[βk × σk] 
− 1). Note that for a set of mutually exclusive categories (F-scale categories, 
day parts, months of the year), one of the dummy variable categories must be 
omitted for the model to be estimated. The impact of the included variables is 
then measured relative to that of a tornado in the excluded category: overnight 
for day parts, July for month, and F0 for F-scale. Table 6A.1 also indicates 
the statistical signifi cance of each of the coeffi cient estimates at two different 
levels, 10 percent and 1 percent, in a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that 
the coeffi cient is zero.
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# observations 20,605 20,605
Log likelihood −1,797 −9,400
NOTE: Fatality estimates use Poisson regression models and injuries use negative 
binomial models with standard errors in parentheses. *signifi cant at the 0.10 level 
(two-tailed test); ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a See Appendix 6A for the distinction in the two calculations of fatalities and injuries.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from SPC, NWS, and U.S. census data.
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